Interprovincial Migration and the Stringency of Energy Policy in China by Luo, Xiaohu et al.
Interprovincial Migration and the 
Stringency of Energy Policy in China
Xiaohu Luo, Da Zhang, Justin Caron, Xiliang Zhang and Valerie J. Karplus
Report No. 270
November 2014
TSINGHUA - MIT
China Energy & Climate Project
The MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change combines cutting-edge scientific research with 
independent policy analysis to provide a solid foundation for the public and private decisions needed to mitigate and 
adapt to unavoidable global environmental changes. Being data-driven, the Program uses extensive Earth system 
and economic data and models to produce quantitative analysis and predictions of the risks of climate change and 
the challenges of limiting human influence on the environment—essential knowledge for the international dialogue 
toward a global response to climate change.  
To this end, the Program brings together an interdisciplinary group from two established MIT research centers: the 
Center for Global Change Science (CGCS) and the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR). These 
two centers—along with collaborators from the Marine Biology Laboratory (MBL) at Woods Hole and short- and long-
term visitors—provide the united vision needed to solve global challenges.  
At the heart of much of the Program’s work lies MIT’s Integrated Global System Model. Through this integrated 
model, the Program seeks to: discover new interactions among natural and human climate system components; 
objectively assess uncertainty in economic and climate projections; critically and quantitatively analyze environmental 
management and policy proposals; understand complex connections among the many forces that will shape our 
future; and improve methods to model, monitor and verify greenhouse gas emissions and climatic impacts.  
This reprint is one of a series intended to communicate research results and improve public understanding of 
global environment and energy challenges, thereby contributing to informed debate about climate change and the 
economic and social implications of policy alternatives.    
 Ronald G. Prinn and John M. Reilly,
 Program Co-Directors 
For more information, contact the Program office: 
MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change
Postal Address: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
77 Massachusetts Avenue, E19-411 
Cambridge, MA  02139 (USA)
Location: 
Building E19, Room 411 
400 Main Street, Cambridge
Access:  
Tel:  (617) 253-7492 
Fax: (617) 253-9845 
Email: globalchange@mit.edu 
Website:  http://globalchange.mit.edu/
1 
Interprovincial Migration and the Stringency of Energy Policy in China 
Xiaohu Luo*‡, Da Zhang‡, Justin Caron‡, Xiliang Zhang*,†, Valerie J. Karplus‡ 
Abstract 
Interprovincial migration flows involve substantial relocation of people and productive activity, with 
implications for regional energy use and greenhouse gas emissions. In China, these flows are not 
explicitly considered when setting energy and environmental targets for provinces, and their potential 
impact on the effectiveness of policy alternatives is ignored. We analyze how migration affects 
outcomes under energy intensity targets and energy caps. While both policies are part of the nation’s 
Twelfth Five Year Plan (2011–2015) and imposed at the provincial level, only the intensity targets are 
binding at present. We estimate a migration model, integrate it into a general equilibrium model that 
resolves each province in China, and simulate the effect of migration on energy use and economic 
activity. We find that although both types of policies are affected by uncertain migration flows, energy 
intensity targets (energy use indexed to economic output) are more robust than absolute caps. They 
are also more cost-effective, placing less burden on the relatively clean in-migration provinces. Our 
findings also underscore the value of moving from provincial targets to an integrated national 
emissions trading system, given that the choice of abatement strategies will adjust endogenously to 
labor relocation. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Several decades of rapid economic growth in China have brought great benefits as well as 
serious environmental challenges. To address the country’s rapidly rising energy use and CO2 
emissions, China’s leaders have implemented mandatory energy and carbon intensity targets and 
non-binding energy caps as part of the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (FYP) (China State Council, 2011). 
The present policy approaches builds on recent efforts to regulate energy intensity and increase 
awareness that the environmental footprint of China’s energy sector is not sustainable. While energy 
saving and emissions reductions have been mentioned in China’s annual reports since the Sixth 
FYP (1981–1986), it was not until the Eleventh FYP (2006–2010) that a binding target for energy 
intensity reduction was introduced. A binding carbon intensity target was added to the Twelfth FYP, 
reflecting China’s commitment at the international climate negotiations in Copenhagen to reduce its 
carbon intensity by 40–45% from 2005 levels by 2020 (Xinhua Net, 2009). Energy caps have only 
recently been more widely discussed as a mechanism for limiting energy use. All targets—for 
energy and carbon intensity as well as total energy use—have historically been assigned at the level 
of individual provinces, although policymakers have recently announced intentions to link 
provincial energy and carbon markets using an emissions trading system. 
This paper examines the interaction of these provincially-set policy designs with a mainstay 
of China’s economic development process: interprovincial migration. While past scholarship has 
proposed a wide range of indices—provincial gross domestic product (GDP), per capita income, 
population, energy use, energy production and industry output shares—to disaggregate targets at 
the provincial level, to our knowledge none have accounted for migration. Among research 
groups that have provided input to the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
in the target-setting process, none has included migration in published analysis (Wei, 2012;  
Yi, 2011). Nevertheless, sheer volumes suggest that migration is likely to be very important—
total interprovincial migration flows reached 100 million between 2001 and 2010 (NBS, 2012). 
Longstanding restrictions on migration following from China’s household registration (or hukou 
system) have led to large gaps in wages and living standards (including access to health care and 
education) among provinces (Whalley and Zhang, 2007). In recent years, hukou restrictions have 
gradually been relaxed, allowing for an increasing share of the country’s population to relocate 
in search of employment. At the same time, rapidly expanding transportation infrastructure (e.g. 
high speed rail) has made inter-city travel more convenient. As a result of these favorable 
conditions, the number of migrants who have relocated, either temporarily or permanently, to 
richer areas (mostly eastern provinces such as Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong, Jiangsu, and 
Zhejiang) has been growing very fast in the last 5 to 10 years (Shen, 2013). For instance, 
according to the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS, 2012), Beijing’s population grew 
from 10.86 million in 1990 to 19.62 million in 2010, at an annual growth rate of about 3.2%—
clearly above China’s natural population growth rate of 0.8%. Also, the pace of migration has 
accelerated in the last few years; in 2010, Beijing saw one million new migrants—more than 5% 
of the city’s population. 
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Depletion in the potential migrant pool as well as declining wage differentials across 
provinces will necessarily slow migration in the future. Despite this, a redoubled emphasis by 
China’s leaders (Li, 2013) on urbanization as a key element of the country’s growth strategy 
going forward means that the rates of migration both within and between provinces are unlikely 
to abate anytime soon. Given the obvious importance of migration within China, a surprisingly 
small number of studies mention its effect on energy use and energy policy. Some, such as 
Auffhammer and Carson (2008), provide evidence that interprovincial migration affects energy 
use and carbon emissions at the provincial level. To our knowledge, no study has explicitly 
investigated the link between migration and energy or climate policy. We aim to fill this gap in 
the literature by analyzing the relationship between interprovincial migration and the projected 
outcomes of alternative energy policy designs.  
Migration affects energy use through several channels. Population shifts affect not only the 
scale of economic activity but also the structure of the economy. Changes in the relative 
availability and cost of labor and other primary factors of production will exert disproportionate 
influence across production sectors. More precisely, an increase in the labor supply will benefit 
industries in proportion to their labor intensity. Migration may also exacerbate the unbalanced 
regional mapping between economic development and energy production. In China, coastal 
provinces are more economically prosperous but short of resources, while central and western 
regions are rich in resources but lag in economic development. Migration from west to east could 
strain already scarce energy and resource supplies in the east as total demand increases; this 
trend will exacerbate energy transport or electricity transmission bottlenecks involved in 
delivering energy to population centers. Energy policy that fails to consider these dynamics 
could impose high and concentrated costs on some provincial economies. 
To quantify the impact of migration on the energy system and its interaction with energy 
policy, we build a model that endogenously determines migration flows and embed it in a 
province-level general equilibrium model. This approach allows us to dynamically track the 
interactions between migration, economic output and energy use. The migration model is used to 
project migration flows to 2020, and allows us to simulate their effect on the patterns of energy 
production and energy use as well as changes in the relative energy intensities of provinces. 
Our work contributes to ongoing research on energy and climate policy design in China, as 
well as literature on the robustness of policy design in the face of uncertain factors (O’Neill  
et al.,  2012). Our analysis yields several findings. First, we find that migration increases total 
national GDP as more people move to more productive provinces, and reduces total energy 
intensity as more people move to less energy-intensive provinces.1 Second, we find that 
migration further widens the gap in energy intensity between the (more energy-intensive) 
out-migration provinces and (less energy-intensive) in-migration provinces. Out-migration 
                                                
1 This result depends crucially on the assumed energy use profile of migrants, both in their province of origin prior 
to migrating and their destination province after relocation. In this study, we assume migrants adopt the 
consumption behavior (productivity and consumption patterns) of the average resident in the destination 
province.  
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provinces see a reduced comparative advantage in services and greater comparative advantage in 
the production of resource-intensive goods, while the opposite occurs in in-migration provinces. 
As a result, energy intensity targets place a greater burden on out-migration provinces. In 
contrast, energy caps do not adjust to changes in economic productivity, and thus place a greater 
burden on the in-migration provinces (which, due to their rapid growth, use more energy in 
absolute terms relative to a no-migration scenario). Energy intensity targets are thus more robust2 
than energy caps to migration flows. Since migration affects energy intensity as well, the energy 
intensity targets are not completely robust to migration, but in relative terms they outperform the 
less flexible energy caps in the face of unanticipated migration flows. Energy caps are less robust 
because they do not reflect changes in economic activity caused by shifts in underlying factor 
and structural conditions.  
Third, highly energy intensive out-migration provinces have cheaper reduction possibilities 
than the cleaner in-migration provinces; therefore, energy intensity targets—which tend to place 
a greater burden on out-migration provinces—may reduce energy use at a lesser cost. Thus, 
intensity targets are also preferable in terms of economic efficiency, as they result in greater 
energy use reduction with lower associated welfare loss. 
2. BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY 
To simulate the interaction between migration and energy policy in China, we develop a novel 
approach for representing population flows within a recursive-dynamic general equilibrium 
model of China’s energy and economic system that separately resolves the nation’s 30 provinces 
and projects migration flows as a function of economic opportunity. Below we discuss how the 
relationships governing migration are estimated and embedded within the simulation model, 
building on previously established methods that (to our knowledge) have not been jointly 
applied. 
2.1 Modeling Migration 
2.1.1 Previous Studies 
Economists have long studied migration of labor and its relationship with patterns of 
economic activity. Starting with Ravenstein (1885), scholars have related migration to income, 
language, distance, and other factors such as age, sex and education. These factors have been 
incorporated into a wide range of models used to project future migration patterns (Kau and 
Sirmans, 1979; Ma and Wang, 2012; Simini et al., 2012). Gravity models have been widely used 
to represent migration flows as being dependent on characteristics of both the origin and 
destination regions as well as the distance between them (Hua and Porell, 1979). Equation 1 is a 
generalized representation of the gravity model as proposed by Zipf (1946): 
  (1) 
                                                
2 We define robustness as the change in the relative magnitude of economic losses due to policy in each province, 
relative to a no-migration scenario. 
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In this equation, represents the number of migrants moving from province o to province 
i,  is the population of the destination (in-migration) province,  is the population of the origin 
(out-migration) province,  is the distance between the two regions, and α and β are the 
estimated coefficients associated with each factor. Gravity models have been widely applied and 
expanded to include factors such as income, health care, education, and transportation 
infrastructure (Dustmann 2003; Lipton 1980; Michael 2003). In general, these models fit 
migration patterns quite well. Almost all studies agree that per capita income or wages are 
closely linked to migration decisions. Similarly, research on China has found that income is most 
important driver of migration (Hu 2002; Zhao and Meng 1999; Zhu 2002). 
2.1.2 Migration Model 
We model migration flows between province pairs as a function of population, average 
income and past migration. Following the generalized form of the gravity model shown in 
Equation 1, we estimate a log-log relationship using a panel of historical data similar to 
Westerlund and Wilhelmsson (2011).  
The generalized model is shown in Equation 2:   
  (2) 
Migration (M) in time period t from province o to province i is a function of the population 
(Pop) of each province, per-capita GDP (GDPpcap) in each province, and the level of migration 
between the two provinces in the previous period. Allowing migration flows to depend on past 
migration captures structural factors affecting average levels of migration, such as distance, 
cultural ties, and transport linkages (these are not directly observed, but they do not change over 
time). Including past migration as an independent variable also prevents province pairs with very 
low migration numbers from disproportionally affecting the coefficient estimates. 
2.1.3 Data 
Data include migration flows between each pair of 30 provinces (without Tibet, Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan), forming a total of 870 data points for three time periods (1995–2000,  
2000–2005 and 2005–2010). Data are supplied by China’s National Bureau of Statistics, which 
conducted a national census of the entire population in 2000 and 2010. We supplement these data 
with population surveys covering 10% of the total population in the intervening years 1995 and 
2005. Of the census participants, 10% were asked to fill out a long-form questionnaire including 
data on the household’s migration patterns. The form asked individuals to state their residence 
status at the time of submission and five years prior (as migrants are defined as individuals who 
changed their province of permanent residence during each five-year period). Survey totals are 
rescaled to obtain an estimate of the total migration flows between province pairs.  
We find that migration is concentrated in a small number of province pairs (90% of migration 
occurs in about 50 of 870 total pairs). We also find that migration is concentrated among the 
working-age population. The vast majority of migrants from 2000 to 2005 were ages 15–40; 
children and the elderly are not nearly as mobile. At present, the volume of migration in China is 
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large and increasing. From 2005 to 2010, the total volume of migration between provinces 
reached 61 million people—approximately the population of Italy. As shown in Figure 1,  
2005–2010 net migration inflows were concentrated in Beijing and other provinces along the 
southeast coast including Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Guangdong; net outflows are 
concentrated in the center and northeast. Data describing provincial population and per capita 
GDP also come from China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2012). We use provincial per-
capita gross domestic product (GDP) instead of per-capita income in our model.3 
 
 
Figure 1.  Net migration between 2005 and 2010 (NBS, 2012). 
2.1.4 Estimation 
Given that migration flows are positive and discrete, the migration model described in 
Equation 2 is estimated using Poisson Maximum-Likelihood, as is standard in the gravity 
literature (Flowerdew and Aitkin, 1982). We first impose restrictions on the model to identify the 
contributions of lagged population, per capita GDP, population and per capita GDP, and past 
migration (see first 4 columns of Table 1).  We find past migration between two provinces to 
explain 95% of the variability in migration patterns, making it the strongest determinant of 
current migration. Population and per capita GDP are also significant determinants, with R2’s of 
0.23 and 0.26. In the Full Specification (see last column of Table 1), we find that on average a 
1% increase in the population of the destination province in the previous period (t-1) results in a 
0.09% increase in in-migration, while a 1% increase in the population of the origin province 
                                                
3 The correlation between GDP per capita and average income is 0.87 (calculated from NBS, 2012). We chose to use 
per-capita GDP because its source is the national accounts, which are deemed more reliable than income data 
which are sourced from household surveys.. 
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increases the volume of out-migration by 0.14%. The effect of GDP per capita is larger in 
magnitude and statistically significant—a 1% increase in GDP per capita in the destination 
province in the previous period results in a 0.346% rise in the expected count of migrants, while 
the GDP per capita of the origin province is estimated to have a negative but not statistically 
significant effect. The Aikaike model selection criterium (AIC) is lowest for the full specification, 
suggesting that the inclusion of all variables is warranted.  
Table 1. Migration model - Poisson PML regression results. 
Dep. Var.: Mi,o,t Population  GDP Population + GDP Past Migration Full Specification 
Populationi,t-1 0.741  (0.000)*  1.178  (0.119)*  0.091  (0.026)* 
Populationo,t-1 1.177  (0.000)*  1.259  (0.080)*  0.142  (0.034)* 
GDPpcapi,t-1  1.430  (0.070)* 2.118  (0.121)*  0.346  (0.039)* 
GDPpcapo,t-1  -0.711  (0.117)* -0.838  (0.122)*  -0.047  (0.039) 
Mi,o,t-1    0.936  (0.010)* 0.866  (0.012)* 
Constant -22.705  (0.005)* 3.772  (1.231)* -44.588  (3.414)* 1.096  (0.113)* -5.176  (1.012)* 
Observations 1740 1740 1740 1740 1740 
R2 0.227 0.266 0.589 0.950 0.958 
AIC 24.8 23.7 13.2 1.58 1.37 
Standard errors in parenthesis; * denotes significance at the 1% level; AIC is the Akaike information criterion.  
These estimates imply that while migration projections based on our model will primarily 
reflect the effect of past migration, they will also be influenced by provincial population and per 
capita GDP. Including population and per-capita GDP in addition to historical migration is 
important to capture the potentially attenuating effect of regional demographic and economic 
changes that could cause migration to deviate from past patterns. 
2.2 Modeling China’s Regional Economy and Energy Use 
2.2.1 Previous Studies 
Methods for projecting energy use and economic activity differ in the level of technology 
detail and macroeconomic feedbacks captured (Böhringer and Rutherford, 2009). To study 
migration and its interactions with energy policy, a model needs to resolve both the key drivers 
of migration and resulting population flows as well as how migration changes local factor 
endowments and prices. For this purpose, we use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
model with regional economic and energy system detail. CGE models have been widely used to 
study the economy-wide impact of energy policies by simulating effects on relative prices 
(Laitner and Hanson, 2006; Rausch et al., 2011). CGE models have also been applied to study 
energy policies, including energy taxes (Dai et al., 2011), emissions caps, emissions taxes  
(Cao, 2007; Liang and Wei, 2012; Wang et al., 2011), emissions intensity targets (Wang et al., 
2009), and energy subsidies and related reforms (Lin and Jiang, 2011).  
Studying the impact of migration within China and its interaction with energy policy requires 
a model with sub-national detail. While models used in the studies cited above represent China 
as a single region, a growing number of studies include provincial detail (Cui et al., 2014; Tang 
and Wu 2013; Zhang et al. 2013). 
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Our work contributes to previous literature that has studied migration (or changes in labor 
endowments) within a CGE framework (Flaig et al., 2013; Rutherford, 2001).  In these models, 
wage differentials drive migration among sectors and regions. This approach fails to capture the 
historical structure of migration patterns (and the drivers implicit in them). Factors such as 
income, population, education and access to transportation change with time, while others are 
permanent (e.g. distances between regions, cultural differences, and language). We therefore 
adopt a novel approach that embeds a migration model calibrated using historical data within a 
CGE framework and solve recursively for economic activity, energy use, and migration flows. 
2.2.2 China Regional Energy Model (C-REM) 
We couple the migration model to the China Regional Energy Model (C-REM), a 
multi-region, multi-sector, recursive-dynamic global general equilibrium model that represents 
30 provinces in mainland China. Sub-national detail in China is parameterized using China’s 
2007 provincial input-output tables and provincial energy balance tables. The rest of the world is 
divided into four regions (United States, Europe, other developing countries, and other 
developed countries), with economic and energy data as well as trade flows among all regions 
parameterized using the GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) data base version 8.4 The 
regional and sectorial aggregation of the C-REM is shown in Table 2.  
Table 2. C-REM regional and sectorial aggregation. 
Regional  Sectorial 
Chinese Provinces Sector Description 
Beijing  BJ Henan HA COL Coal mining and processing 
Tianjin  TJ Hubei HB CRU Crude petroleum products 
Hebei  HE Hunan HN GAS Natural gas products 
Shanxi  SX Guangdong  GD OIL Petroleum refining, cooking & nuclear fuels 
Mongolia  NM Guangxi GX EIS Energy intensive industries 
Liaoning  LN Hainan HI MAN Other manufacturing industries 
Jilin  JL Chongqing CQ ELE Electricity and heat 
Heilongjiang HL Sichuan SC WTR Water 
Shanghai SH Guizhou GZ CON Construction 
Jiangsu JS Yunnan  YN TRN Transportation and Post 
Zhejiang ZJ Shaanxi  SN SER Services 
Anhui AH Gansu  GS OMN Metal/non-metal minerals, other mining 
Fujian FJ Qinghai  QH AGR Agriculture, forestry, livestock 
Jiangxi JX Ningxia NX   
Shandong SD Xinjiang  XJ   
Other Regions   
Other Developed Countries*  ODC   
United States  USA   
Europe  EUR   
Rest of the World  ROW   
 * Other Developed Countries include Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. 
                                                
4 Discrepancies between national and provincial energy statistics in China are well documented (Guan et al., 2012). We 
scale total energy use to match nationally-reported totals, preserving energy type shares based on provincial data. 
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We extend the static version of C-REM documented in Zhang et al. (2013) to include a 
dynamic projection to 2010, 2015 and 2020. The projection for 2010 is calibrated to historical 
observations (NBS, 2012), while projections for 2015 and 2020 reflect a reference regional 
economic growth assumption (based on the Twelfth Five-Year Plan and near-term expectations 
of each province, e.g. Guangdong Statistic Bureau (2011)). We calibrate 2010 energy quantities 
by province to published statistics for the same year by first calibrating the model to observed 
economic growth, then exogenously tuning energy efficiency to match published energy 
quantities. Prices evolve endogenously in the C-REM model. Migration and energy policy 
scenarios affect the relative availability of capital and labor as well as the relative cost of 
available energy types. The savings rate is calibrated to base year data (as in the MIT EPPA 
model (Paltsev et al., 2005)) while labor productivity rises at a decreasing rate.  
Labor supply L in each region r is updated according to the equation below: 
  (3) 
Where N is population (determined by the migration model),  is labor force participation, 
and  is labor productivity per worker. Migration affects N mechanically, but its effect on S and 
 is less obvious.5 In the absence of conclusive data about the effects of migration on  and , 
we assume that they are unaffected. Given that we are projecting over a relatively short time 
horizon (to 2020),  is further assumed to remain constant over the 10-year time horizon of our 
projection6, while the growth rate  of  is calibrated as follows. The initial labor 
productivity growth rate  is calibrated to observed economic growth by adjusting the 
available capital stock for the years 2007 and 2010. We then assume it to decrease over time 
according to the relationship shown in Equation 4. 
  (4) 
Where  is the long-term (100 years) growth rate of labor productivity, assumed to be 2% 
per year. We adopt values of the shape parameters  and  from previous studies, setting them 
as 0.1 and 0.07 respectively (Paltsev et al., 2005). Productivity will thus adjust from its initial 
growth rate towards its final long-term value in an S-shaped fashion. Absent migration, each 
province’s population is assumed to grow by 0.48% per year—the natural population growth rate 
for China as a whole, forecast by the UN Population Division (UN, 2011).   
We also assume that provincial capital stocks in each time period grow according to the 
provincial value-added growth rate . A portion of capital stock is assumed to malleable in 
each period and can be repurposed across all sectors, while the remainder of the stock is fixed by 
its existing uses. This prevents large reallocations of capital between sectors and limits the scope 
                                                
5 For example, migrants originating in poor provinces may lack educational or professional skills relative to the 
labor force of the destination province, lowering the overall  of that province; working-age migrants who are 
more productive than the average local worker seeking employment may raise  in the destination province. 
6 This assumption is unlikely to hold over a longer time horizon. The one-child policy, started in 1980, has resulted 
in an increasing proportion of the retired population over time. This effect will increase after 2020. 
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for changes in the economy’s structure and in the mix of energy production technologies within 
each period. 
Land, wind, hydropower, and fossil fuel resources are represented as fixed resource as in the 
MIT EPPA model and shared out by province as in Zhang et al. (2013). Each region in C-REM 
includes an assumption regarding the speed at which energy efficiency improves over time 
independently of changes in relative prices. For the United States, this long-run autonomous 
energy efficiency improvement is assumed to be about 1% per year (Paltsev et al., 2005), while 
in Chinese provinces it is estimated to be approximately 2% (Cao and Ho, 2010). Trade in goods 
and services is determined according to the Armington assumption of differentiated products by 
country of origin. Elasticities are calibrated such that domestic goods entering a province are 
closer substitutes to local goods than to those originating outside of China, as in Caron et al. 
(2015). 
2.3 Model Coupling 
In order to capture how migration impacts the evolution of China’s economy and energy 
systems, we solve the migration and C-REM models in a coupled fashion (Figure 2). In each 
time step, we use projected population of each province from the migration model as an input to 
C-REM, while the changes in GDP per capita computed in C-REM are used as an input to the 
migration model. After relocation, migrants are assumed to receive the new equilibrium average 
wage in the destination province, which ceteris paribus would tend to fall with an increase in the 
labor supply. We assume that provincial capital stocks are fixed within each time period. 
Migrants are assumed to adopt the consumption patterns of residents in the destination province7. 
Out-migration provinces will see a reduction in both consumption and labor supply as a result of 
migration. 
 
Figure 2. Coupling of the general equilibrium model (C-REM) and the migration model.  
                                                
7 There is no data available describing differences in consumption patterns between migrants and local consumers. 
While migrants’ consumption patterns may well deviate from provincial averages, we expect that our assumption 
may tend to overestimate impacts on consumption, especially if migrants systematically secure lower-paying 
jobs and consume less relative to the provincial average. 
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3. RESULTS 
3.1 Migration Projections 
Projected migration based on coupled runs of the C-REM and migration model is shown in 
Figure 3. Interestingly, despite historically observed rapid growth, the model simulates a peak in 
the total number of migrants at around 100 million from 2010–2015, with migration falling back 
to around 60 million from 2015–2020. This peak is largely explained by a decline in wage 
differentials between out- and in-migration provinces. Both historically and in the model 
projections, in-migration provinces experience lower and declining GDP growth, while 
out-migration provinces grow more rapidly. As wage differentials narrow, migration volumes 
decline. Figure A3 in the Appendix illustrates the negative relationship between average growth 
and net migration between 2005 and 2010. Population projections for all Chinese provinces are 
shown in the Appendix Table A1. Throughout the remainder of this paper, scenarios with 
migration include the migration projection in addition to natural population growth, while 
scenarios without migration include natural growth only.  
According to our coupled model simulation, cumulative in-migration from 2010 to 2020 as a 
percentage of population (in 2010) is largest in Shanghai (SH, 39%), Beijing (BJ, 38%), and 
Zhejiang (ZJ, 33%), while the largest out-migration is experienced in Hunan (HN, -22%), 
Jiangxi (JX, -22%) and Anhui (AH, -20%). Guangdong (GD, 33.95 million) receives the largest 
absolute number of migrants, while the origin of the largest number of migrants is Henan (HA, 
13.68 million). 
 
Figure 3. Total historical and projected migration (millions). 
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3.2 Baseline Projection for GDP and Energy Use 
We develop two baseline (no policy) projections—one with migration (WM) and one with no 
migration (NM) to understand the influence of migration on the economy and energy use. Now 
and throughout the remainder of this report, we define energy use as the direct use of secondary 
energy (electricity, refined oil, gas and coal) in final demand (by households and the 
government) and as an input to industry. Table 3 reveals several effects of inter-provincial 
migration. First, migration increases the annual national GDP growth rate by approximately 
0.1%, as migrants tend to move to provinces with higher average productivity. We note, 
however, that this number is contingent on our assumption that migrants immediately adopt the 
average characteristics of their new province. We expect that this effect would be larger if 
migrants were unemployed or under-employed in their province of origin, but fully employed 
after migration. If migrants systematically contribute less than local laborers to the labor force 
(and consume less) in the destination province, the effect on GDP would be smaller (and could 
potentially disappear). The increase in GDP due to migration leads to an increase in income, and 
thus increases overall energy use. Finally, as migrants move to less energy intensive provinces, 
the national energy intensity decreases slightly.  
Table 3. Baseline economic and energy system outputs with migration (WM) and without migration (NM). 
 2010 Data 
2020 
Projection 
2010–2020 
Annual growth rate  
GDP (bn$ 2007 USD)    
   Without migration 5,148 9,680 6.52% 
   With migration 5,148 9,761 6.61% 
Energy use (Mtce)8    
   Without migration 3,296 5,800 5.81% 
   With migration 3,296 5,845 5.90% 
Energy Intensity (Mtce/bn$ 2007 USD)    
   Without migration 0.6402 0.5992 -0.66% 
   With migration 0.6402 0.5989 -0.67% 
 
Modest changes at the national level mask heterogeneity across provinces. For example, in 
Table 4, we see that for the in-migration provinces Beijing (BJ) and Shanghai (SH), GDP is 
more than 17% higher with migration than without migration, and the energy use is more than 
14% higher. In the out-migration provinces, such as Anhui (AH) and Jiangxi (JX), with 
migration the GDP is more than 13% lower and energy use is more than 4.5% lower than without 
migration. In general, while the effects of migration on GDP and energy use are correlated, it is 
of larger magnitude for GDP than energy use. The explanation for this is that most energy 
resources are located in the out-migration provinces. Because the location of fossil fuel 
extraction is fixed, and because frictions in the model limit rapid changes in the patterns of 
energy trade, the price elasticity of energy supply is fairly low in the out-migration provinces. 
                                                
8 Mega tons of Coal Equivalent 
13 
This implies that energy supply does not fully adapt to the movement of migrants, so migration 
affects the relative availability of labor and energy. 
A larger labor force favors labor-intensive sectors, which also tend to be less energy intensive. 
In-migration provinces will increase their specialization in labor-intensive sectors, while 
out-migration provinces increase their specialization in energy-intensive sectors.  
Table 4. GDP, energy use and energy intensity change with migration relative to no migration in 2020. 
Provinces GDP change (%) Energy use change (%) Energy intensity change (%) 
Guizhou -13.7 -0.8 14.9 
Jiangxi -13.3 -4.6 10.0 
Anhui -13.2 -4.8 9.7 
Hunan -12.6 -5.2 8.5 
Chongqing -11.2 -2.1 10.2 
Sichuan -10.9 -4.0 7.7 
Henan -10.8 -4.4 7.2 
Hubei -10.3 -6.5 4.2 
Guangxi -8.3 -2.8 6.0 
Gansu -6.9 -2.9 4.3 
Heilongjiang -6.9 -5.0 2.0 
Jilin -4.3 -0.8 3.7 
Hebei -3.0 0.3 3.4 
Shaanxi -2.9 0.1 3.1 
Shanxi -2.6 -1.6 1.0 
Yunnan -2.6 -1.2 1.4 
Shandong -2.3 -0.7 1.6 
Qinghai 0.4 0.5 0.1 
Liaoning 1.4 1.4 0.0 
Inner Mongolia 2.4 1.3 -1.1 
Ningxia 3.1 2.6 -0.5 
Xinjiang 3.1 5.0 1.8 
Hainan 3.6 1.0 -2.5 
Jiangsu 5.4 3.4 -1.9 
Fujian 6.1 4.1 -1.9 
Guangdong 13.3 8.9 -3.9 
Zhejiang 15.2 13.0 -1.9 
Shanghai 17.3 14.3 -2.6 
Tianjin 18.3 8.0 -8.7 
Beijing 18.6 15.1 -3.0 
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Figure 4 shows the negative relationship between net in-migration and energy intensity 
across provinces in the data, and we observe that net in-migration provinces are on average less 
energy-intensive. Figure 5 displays differences in sectorial output with migration (relative to no 
migration) in both in-migration and out-migration provinces.9 It reveals a disproportionately 
large increase in the services sector of the in-migration provinces relative to the increase in 
energy production and the output of energy intensive industries. Output of energy intensive 
industries does not decrease as much in the out-migration provinces, and their production of 
fossil fuel energy actually increases. Similarly, households in the out-migration provinces will 
increase their consumption of energy. Overall, migration tends to increase the energy intensity of 
the net out-migration provinces and decrease that of in-migration provinces. Figure 6 shows the 
relationship between migration and change in energy intensity by province. 
 
Figure 4. Relationship between net in-migration and energy intensity across provinces. 
                                                
9 Grouped according to net in or out migration in Figure 1. FFP corresponds to primary fossil production and is the 
aggregate of COL, OIL, CRU and GAS. 
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Figure 5. The weighted average changes in sectorial output caused by migration in in-migration and 
out-migration province groups. 
 
 
Figure 6. Projected net migration against projected change in energy intensity (2010–2015). 
16 
We illustrate the impact of migration using two provinces, Shanghai and Anhui, as an 
example. Migration flows between Shanghai and Anhui rank among the largest in China at 
around 1.7 million people from 2006 to 2010, as many migrants leave Anhui, a relatively poor 
area, for Shanghai, one of the most affluent centers of commerce on the Chinese mainland. As 
shown in Table 5, our simulations reveal that migration contributes 1.6 percentage points to 
Shanghai’s annual GDP growth rate, which was 4.6% for the simulation period 2010–2020. 
Higher growth also leads to an increase in energy use, though it is proportionally lower than the 
project growth in GDP. This example shows how failing to consider migration would lead 
policymakers to underestimate the absolute increase in energy use in Shanghai. If an energy cap 
is set without considering migration, the burden on Shanghai could be larger than expected. By 
contrast, failing to consider migration policymakers would lead to underestimation of the 
projected reduction in energy intensity; therefore, energy intensity targets would place less of a 
burden on in-migration provinces like Shanghai. 
Table 5. GDP and energy use of Shanghai and Anhui at baseline. 
 No Migration (NM)  With Migration (WM) 
 
2010 
Data 
2020  
Projection 
2010–2020 
Annual growth rate 
 2020  
Projection 
2010–2020 
Annual growth rate 
GDP (2007 bn$)       
   Shanghai 213.7 288.2 3.0%  336.1 4.6% 
   Anhui 140.0 300.6 7.9%  274.6 7.0% 
Energy use (Mtce)       
   Shanghai 95.9 138.2 3.7%  156.0 5.0% 
   Anhui 84.7 154.7 6.2%  149.2 5.8% 
Energy Intensity       
   Shanghai 0.449 0.479 0.7%  0.464 0.3% 
   Anhui 0.605 0.514 -1.6%  0.543 -1.1% 
3.3 Policy Simulation 
The remainder of our analysis is focused on understanding how energy policy outcomes in 
China will be affected by future migration flows. We compare energy caps and energy intensity 
targets, two prevalent policy designs under consideration in China, to be set at the provincial 
level with the aim of achieving an overall national target.  
While the actual mechanism for enforcing targets at the provincial level is a complex 
combination of project approvals and directives, here we simulate both types of targets as a 
constraint on total energy or energy intensity that is achieved by endogenously increasing the 
price of energy to a level that results in target compliance as in Zhang et al. (2013). Specifically, 
we target the direct use of secondary energy.  
We simulate the following scenarios: 
• Energy Cap + Energy Intensity Policies without Migration (ENM). We set an energy 
cap and energy intensity targets to achieve a level of energy (intensity) reduction 
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consistent with China’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan (2011–2015), and extended it for the 
Thirteenth Five-Year Plan (2016–2020) at the same level of stringency. Province-specific 
targets can be found in Table A2 in the Appendix. The average energy intensity reduction 
target is 15.7% with a standard deviation of 2.1%. Nationally, targets correspond to a 
16% reduction in energy intensity. We design these policies such that they produce 
identical outcomes in the absence of changes in migration or economic growth 
assumptions. This allows us to focus on the deviations caused by introducing migration in 
the following two scenarios. 
• Energy Cap Policy with Migration (ECM). The energy cap described for the ENM 
scenario is implemented. The only difference is that migration is simulated. 
• Energy Intensity Policy with Migration (EIM). The energy intensity policy described 
for the ENM scenario is implemented. The only difference is that migration is simulated. 
In line with literature focusing on policy robustness (Anderies et al., 2013), we consider the 
robustness of these two policies by measuring how well the effective distribution of burden 
across provinces (expressed in terms of welfare loss) matches the intention of policy makers.  
Then, we compare their relative efficiency in terms of reducing energy use at minimal cost. 
  To investigate robustness, we compare welfare impacts of the ECM and EIM scenarios to 
the ENM scenario, which provides a suitable benchmark and represents consensus on the 
distribution of policy burdens embodied in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan. To do so, we define a 
welfare impact index  to quantify the percentage change of the welfare loss of scenario   
(  being either ECM or EIM) compared to the policy maker’s expectation (Equation 5). We then 
build a robustness index , which quantifies the overall deviations of provincial welfare 
changes compared to those of the ENM scenario. It corresponds to the weighted average absolute 
deviation of welfare changes and is computed as follows in Equation 6: 
   (5) 
  (6) 
In Equation 5,  is the welfare implied by scenario S in province r. Therefore,  
 and  represent the welfare change of 
province  under the  scenario and scenario ENM, respectively;  is the consumption level of 
province  under the ENM scenario. Hence,  quantifies the weighted average deviation of 
welfare changes under the  scenario compared to the ENM scenario. The smaller , the more 
robust the policy is. Quantitatively, we estimate  to be 24.5%—significantly higher than 
, which we find to be 15.8%. Energy intensity targets are more robust and better reflect the 
distribution of burden intended by the policy makers, but they still fail to do so entirely. 
Figure 7 displays the impact of migration on the welfare change index  for each province. 
The ECM scenario generates larger deviations in general, especially for major in-migration 
provinces, such as Beijing and Shanghai. On top of this difference in magnitude, the patterns of 
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deviations between ECM and EIM are almost opposite. By underestimating the positive impact 
of migration on their total GDP and energy use, the energy cap puts a greater burden on the 
in-migration provinces; by underestimating the increase in their energy intensity, the energy 
intensity policy puts a greater burden on the out-migration provinces.  
 
Figure 7. Welfare impact of migration (  in percentage relative to no migration (ENM) scenario across 
provinces. Positive value indicates that policy will increase welfare relative to the ENM case. 
Because each policy puts the burden of energy use reduction on different provinces, they will 
lead to different overall costs and total energy use. It is cheaper to reduce energy use in the 
out-migration provinces, as more efficient production processes have already been widely 
applied in the more developed, lower energy intensity in-migration provinces in the east (see 
Figure 5). This is made evident by comparing the average shadow price of energy use reduction 
in the in-migration provinces to the average shadow price of out-migration provinces. In the 
ENM scenario, the average shadow price of the energy policy in out-migration provinces is $50 
per ton of coal equivalent (tce), while it is $190/tce for in-migration provinces. The energy cap 
policy puts more burden on in-migration provinces in which energy reductions are costlier and 
thus leads to higher GDP and welfare losses than the energy intensity policy. National results for 
the three scenarios are summarized in Table 6. All changes in the table are expressed relative to 
the corresponding no policy scenario (that is, the ENM scenario is expressed relative to the NM 
baseline scenario, whereas the ECM and EIM scenarios are expressed relative to the WM 
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baseline scenario). In the absence of migration (ENM), national welfare loss reaches 1.69% of 
consumption (measured as equivalent variation) in 2020. With migration, consumption loss is 
20% higher than ENM under the energy cap (ECM) and only 5% higher under the energy 
intensity policy (EIM). 
Table 6. National GDP, energy use and welfare change by policies (% change).  
Year 2015  2020 
Scenarios ENM ECM EIM  ENM ECM EIM 
GDP -0.58 -0.66 -0.65  -2.35 -2.62 -2.47 
Energy use -12.28 -13.20 -13.27  -24.91 -25.49 -26.12 
Welfare -0.42 -0.55 -0.44  -1.69 -2.02 -1.78 
Energy intensity -11.76 -12.61 -12.71  -23.09 -23.48 -24.24 
ENM: Energy cap/intensity policy without migration; ECM: Energy cap policy with migration; EIM: Energy intensity 
policy with migration. 
The policies also have different effects on total national energy use. For ECM, more stringent 
energy use reduction targets in the in-migration provinces cause relocation of energy intensive 
industries to the out-migration provinces. For EIM, because the energy resources are mostly 
located in the out-migration provinces, the potential for relocation of energy-intensive industries 
is much smaller when larger reductions are expected from the out-migration provinces. Overall, 
Table 6 shows that the EIM policy leads to a larger reduction in total energy use than the energy 
cap, and indeed, we find that net embodied emissions in domestic trade from out-migration 
provinces to in-migration provinces10 are significantly higher in the ECM scenario (see 
Figure 8). Together, these results indicate that, in the face of migration, energy intensity targets 
lead to a higher reduction in energy use at lower cost (lower GDP and welfare loss) and are 
therefore more efficient overall than provincial energy caps. 
 
Figure 8. Embodied energy use in export commodities from out-migration provinces to in-migration 
provinces. 
                                                
10 Calculated using a multi-regional input-output decomposition as in Böhringer et al. (2012). 
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4. CONCLUSION 
Using a newly developed coupled modeling approach to represent the macroeconomic and 
energy impacts of migration within a CGE framework, we show that if policies are to be set at 
the provincial level, energy intensity targets are both more efficient and more robust to uncertain 
levels of migration than energy caps. Although the amount of interprovincial migration in China 
is very large and will maintain its momentum for several more years, our model projects that it 
will peak before 2020, as wage differentials between province pairs will then decrease. Though 
migration has minor impacts on the growth of GDP and energy use at the national level, 
provincial changes could be significant. For example, major eastern in-migration provinces  
(e.g. Beijing and Shanghai) will increase their output, largely due to more abundant labor supply. 
Energy use, however, is not projected to increase as rapidly for in-migration provinces—nor 
decrease as rapidly in out-migration provinces—as GDP. Thus, migration will further increase 
the relative energy-intensity of out-migration provinces relative to in-migration provinces. 
Our analysis shows how migration can affect the implementation of energy policy by 
changing both relative factor endowments as well as the consumption profile of individual 
provinces. If energy policy is set at the provincial level without built-in mechanisms to adjust 
targets based on quantities most affected by these uncertainties—such as economic productivity 
and energy intensity—inevitably some provinces will find it easier to meet the overall targets 
than others, with implications about welfare losses. Moreover, energy policy could further 
contribute to regional disparities as tightly constrained in-migration provinces face ever-stronger 
incentives to outsource production to out-migration provinces in order to meet provincial limits.  
Our work also points to a broader set of uncertainties that may affect the cost effectiveness of 
provincial energy policy. Here, we focus only on the “net migration” between province pairs, but 
we do not explicitly consider urbanization that may occur within provinces, potentially with 
important implications for the efficiency and structure of energy use (O’Neill et al., 2012). The 
interaction of urbanization with provincial energy targets is a fruitful area for future research. 
If China remains in a provincial policy paradigm—which is likely, given China’s 
well-established institutional environment that enlists provincial governments in the local 
implementation of national policy directives—an energy intensity target is favorable to an energy 
cap for both efficiency and robustness measures. However, this result holds only if targets are set 
province-by-province, with no opportunity to equalize marginal costs across geographies. Policy 
instruments that bind at the national rather than provincial level would reduce energy use in 
provinces where it costs least and respond to changes in the ranking of cost-effective reduction 
opportunities caused by migration. Therefore, while an energy intensity target is found to be 
superior to a cap in the provincial policy paradigm, a national intensity target or a national 
energy cap would both be uniformly superior. This finding provides strong impetus for China’s 
policymakers to continue efforts to establish a national CO2 emissions trading system. 
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APPENDIX  
Table A1. Projection of populations by province (millions of people).11 
 
Population 
Data 
Net Migration 
Projected 
Projected Population 
With Migration               No Migration 
 2010 2010-2015 2015-2020 2015 2020 2015 2020 
Beijing 19.62 5.04 3.70 24.66 28.36 20.08 20.57 
Tianjin 12.99 2.71 1.81 15.70 17.51 13.25 13.57 
Hebei 71.94 -2.84 -0.86 69.10 68.24 73.59 75.37 
Shanxi 35.74 -1.58 -0.34 34.16 33.82 36.58 37.46 
Inner Mongolia 24.72 1.98 0.82 26.70 27.52 25.30 25.92 
Liaoning 43.75 2.32 0.65 46.07 46.72 44.80 45.89 
Jilin 27.47 -0.61 -0.45 26.86 26.41 28.12 28.80 
Heilongjiang 38.33 -1.77 -1.03 36.56 35.53 39.24 40.19 
Shanghai 23.03 7.82 2.76 30.85 33.61 23.57 24.14 
Jiangsu 78.69 10.42 3.51 89.11 92.62 80.56 82.51 
Zhejiang 54.47 15.8 5.66 70.27 75.93 55.74 57.09 
Anhui 59.57 -6.71 -2.84 52.86 50.02 60.94 62.41 
Fujian 36.93 4.95 1.96 41.88 43.84 37.78 38.70 
Jiangxi 44.62 -6.09 -1.85 38.53 36.68 45.64 46.75 
Shandong 95.88 -0.48 -0.39 95.40 95.01 98.11 100.48 
Henan 94.05 -9.72 -3.96 84.33 80.37 96.3 98.63 
Hubei 57.28 -5.35 -2.00 51.93 49.93 58.62 60.04 
Hunan 65.70 -9.18 -2.45 56.52 54.07 67.29 68.92 
Guangdong 104.41 25.25 8.70 129.66 138.36 106.84 109.42 
Guangxi 46.10 -1.63 -1.15 44.47 43.32 47.14 48.28 
Hainan 8.69 0.52 0.20 9.21 9.41 8.88 9.10 
Chongqing 28.85 -2.43 -0.80 26.42 25.62 29.54 30.26 
Sichuan 80.45 -6.05 -2.93 74.4 71.47 82.35 84.34 
Guizhou 34.79 -1.97 -1.45 32.82 31.37 35.59 36.45 
Yunnan 46.02 -0.44 -0.35 45.58 45.23 47.08 48.21 
Shaanxi 37.35 -0.42 -0.49 36.93 36.44 38.22 39.15 
Gansu 25.60 -1.64 -0.77 23.96 23.19 26.19 26.82 
Qinghai 5.63 0.28 0.06 5.91 5.97 5.76 5.90 
Ningxia 6.33 0.41 0.13 6.74 6.87 6.45 6.61 
Xinjiang 21.85 1.43 0.65 23.28 23.93 22.34 22.88 
 
                                                
11 The prediction of population is based on the economic model as well; therefore the population prediction will be 
different in each scenario. This is the baseline prediction.  
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Table A2. Energy intensity reduction target (%) allocation of 11th, 12th, 13th FYP. 
 
11th FYP 
2006–2010 
12th FYP 
2011–2015 
13th FYP 
2016–2020 
Beijing 26.59 17 17 
Tianjin 21 18 18 
Hebei 20.11 17 17 
Shanxi 22.66 16 16 
Inner Mongolia 22.62 15 15 
Liaoning 20.01 17 17 
Jilin 22.04 16 16 
Heilongjiang 20.79 16 16 
Shanghai 20 18 18 
Jiangsu 20.45 18 18 
Zhejiang 20.01 18 18 
Anhui 20.36 16 16 
Fujian 16.45 16 16 
Jiangxi 20.04 16 16 
Shandong 22.09 17 17 
Henan 20.12 16 16 
Hubei 21.67 16 16 
Hunan 20.43 16 16 
Guangdong 16.42 18 18 
Guangxi 15.22 15 15 
Hainan 12.14 10 10 
Chongqing 20.95 16 16 
Sichuan 20.31 16 16 
Guizhou 20.06 15 15 
Yunnan 17.41 15 15 
Shaanxi 20.25 16 16 
Gansu 20.26 15 15 
Qinghai 17.04 10 10 
Ningxia 20.09 15 15 
Xinjiang 08.91 10 10 
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Figure A1. Industrial structure of each province in 2007. Bubble size indicates the percentage of the 
sector output. 
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Figure A2. GDP percentage change vs. energy use percentage change with migration in 2020. 
 
 
Figure A3. Net in-migration of provinces vs. annual GDP growth rate 
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